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STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether the District Court acted properly in
dismissing appellant's claim because of appellant's failure to
comply with the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953 as amended)

states in pertinent part as follows:
No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs, but not to exceed four years after
the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence, except that:

(b) In an action where it is alleged that a
patient has been prevented from discovering
misconduct on the part of a health care
provider because that health care provider
has affirmatively acted to fraudulently
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim
shall be barred unless commenced within one
year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered the
fraudulent concealment, whichever first
occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall
apply to all persons, regardless of
minority or other legal disability under
section 78-12-36 or any other provision of
the law . . . .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding, issued an
Order on July 20, 1987, granting Summary Judgment in favor
of the respondents and finding as follows:
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, the plaintiff
discovered or through the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered
that he had sustained an injury and that
the injury was caused by negligent action
more than two years before he commenced an
action against the health care providers;
consequently, his claims of medical
malpractice are barred by the statute of
limitations prescribed in Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4
(1953 as amended).
(R. 186-88).
Following the court's issuing of the above Order,
this appeal was taken.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arises from a claim of medical
malpractice made against Dr. Lindem for surgery performed
on Charles Floyd (hereinafter "appellant") on December 10,
1981.

Appellant alleges that Dr. Lindem1s surgery was

unauthorized and performed without appellant's knowledge of the
risks involved.
Appellant experienced unexpected discomfort
immediately following the surgery.

Because of continued

problems following that surgery, on or about March or April of
1982, appellant met with Dr. Lindem and discovered that the
surgery performed in December of 1981 involved procedures that
were not requested and that appellant did not desire to be
performed.

Appellant knew at that time that the discomfort he

suffered was a result of this unauthorized surgery.
Appellant served his Notice of Intent to Commence
Litigation on November 27, 1985. This notice was served long
after the two-year statute of limitations for bringing a
medical malpractice claim, since appellant discovered his
injuries on or before March or April of 1982.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent contends that the applicable two-year
statute of limitations bars appellant's action in this
case.

By April of 1982, appellant was informed that
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Dr. Lindem had performed allegedly unauthorized surgery upon
him and that the symptoms appellant was suffering resulted from
that surgery.

Therefore, by April 1982, appellant was aware of

his injury, its alleged cause and the party who allegedly
caused the injury.

Such knowledge was clearly sufficient to

lead a reasonable person to conclude that he may have a cause
of action against the health care provider.

Accordingly,

appellant had enough information to commence the running of the
statute of limitations.

That statute of limitations ran in

April of 1984 and appellant's Notice of Intent to Commence
Litigation was filed nineteen months after the running of the
statute.
POINT I
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE APPROPRIATE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
In his brief, appellant properly points out that this
Court must evaluate all evidence used by the trial court in
reaching its summary judgment determination in the light most
favorable to the appellant.

Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins.

Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986).

However, even applying this

standard of review, appellant's claims against the respondents
are clearly barred by Utah's two-year medical malpractice
statute of limitations.
Utah law requires that a malpractice action against a
health care provider be brought within two years after
appellant discovers or reasonably should have discovered the
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injury.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953

as amended) of the

Health Care Malpractice Act states in part as follows:
(1) No malpractice action against a
health care provider may be brought unless
it is commenced within two years after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs, but not to exceed four years after
the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence . . . .
This discovery rule is discussed further in Foil v.
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).

In Foil, the Utah

Supreme Court stated that:
the two-year provision does not commence to
run until the injured person knew or should
have known that he had sustained an injury
and that the injury was caused by negligent
action.
Id. at 148. Apply the unequivocal language of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953

as amended), especially in light of its

application in Foil, there can be not question that
appellant's claims against respondents are barred by the
running of the two-year statute of limitations.
From the testimony at appellant's deposition,
appellant learned shortly after the operation that the surgery
performed on him was more extensive than he had authorized.
Appellant claimed that the operation performed on him was to
repair a hiatal hernia by repairing a tear between the
esophagus and the stomach.

No mention was made of any

additional procedures to correct other problems.
Appellant's Depo., p. 83, lines 16-22.)
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(R. 199:

Within three or four months after appellant's
surgery, appellant stated he began to suffer symptoms of
diarrhea, pain in his stomach, gradual weight loss and
depression.

(R. 199: Appellant's Depo., p. 95, lines 5-24.)

Upon appellant's discussion of these unexpected symptoms with
his treating physician, appellant was informed that additional
surgery has been performed on his stomach besides the surgery
on his hiatal hernia.

Appellant was told that extensive

surgery had been performed on his stomach to treat gastric
ulcer disease.

Appellant was well aware at the time of this

discussion that he had never discussed such surgery with his
treating physician prior to the December 1981 operation and
that he had not consented to such surgery.

(R. 199:

Appellant's Depo., p. 97, lines 2-18.)
Appellant also had further notice in September of
1982 that the surgery performed by Dr. Lindem was more
extensive than simply repairing his hiatal hernia.

In

September of 1982, Dr. Wilcox contacted Dr. Lindem's office
and received information concerning the extensive nature of
appellant's surgery.

Dr. Wilcox told appellant of this

conversation at Dr. Lindem's office and advised appellant
that he may have additional complications as a result of this
extended surgery on appellant.
pp. 99-100, lines 14-25, 1.)

(R. 199: Appellant's Depo.,

The above statements from

appellant's deposition clearly indicate that appellant knew or
should have known he had sustained an injury and that the
injury was caused by a negligent action.
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Accordingly, the

lower court properly ruled that appellant's claims against
respondents are barred by Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-4 (1953 as
amended).
A number of recent opinions have addressed similar
statutes of limitations.

For example, in Hargett v.

Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (Utah 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986), the Court, in
interpreting Utah's medical malpractice statute, stated that:
The crucial guestion is whether the
plaintiff was aware of the facts that would
lead a reasonable person to conclude that
he may have a cause of action against a
health care provider. Those facts include
the existence of an injury, its cause and
the possibility of negligence.
In another case, Magoc v. Hooker, 796 F.2d 377 (10th
Cir. 1986), the Tenth Circuit affirmed a Utah District Court
ruling barring the plaintiff's claims due to the two-year
statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1(1).

The

court in Magoc held as follows:
Plaintiff's counsel argues that [plaintiff
did not] know the full extent of
defendants' negligence, which was only
learned later. The district court rejected
his argument, as do we. To adopt such
reasoning would, in practical effect, wipe
out the statute.
Id. at 379. Therefore, in accordance with the Hargett
and Magoc rationale outlined above, even if a potential
plaintiff does not understand the "full extent of a defendant's
negligence," the limitation period will commence to run. As
indicated in appellant's deposition, appellant was aware of
facts sufficient to lead a reasonable person to conclude that
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he may have a cause of action against the health care provider
when he learned in April of 1982 that Dr. Lindem had
allegedly performed unauthorized surgery and that the symptoms
he was suffering from were a result at that surgery.

Appellant

was aware of "an injury,11 its "cause," and the "possibility of
negligence."

Despite appellant's contention that he did not

know "the full extent of the respondents' negligence,"
appellant had sufficient information to commence the running of
the statute of limitations.

Appellant's Notice of Intent to

Commence Litigation against respondents is dated November 27,
1985, and clearly was not filed within the two-year statute of
limitations after appellant's discovery of this unauthorized
surgery as noted above.
Respondent's position is further supported by the
case of Miller v. A.H. Robins, Co., 766 F.2d 1102 (7th
Cir. 1985).

The Miller case involved a similar two-year

statute of limitations for appellant to bring a malpractice
action against a physician.

In Miller, appellant had a

Dalcon shield inserted in her uterus in 1972.

In 1974,

appellant was treated for a pelvic infection and the Dalcon
shield was removed.

Despite the court recognizing that various

affidavits were submitted by treating physicians indicating
those physicians had no recollection of advising appellant that
her problems in 1974 were related to her use of the Dalcon
shield, appellant's own testimony that her treating physicians
told her in 1974 that the Dalcon shield was a possible cause
of her illness was sufficient for the court to commence running
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of the applicable discovery statute•

Therefore, appellant's

suit filed in 1981 after appellant discovered that the damage
from the Dalcon shield caused her infertility was clearly
barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Id. at 1106.

By applying the court's rationale in Miller to the
case at bar, appellant's own testimony in his deposition that
his treating physicians admitted to him on or before September
of 1982 that additional surgery had been performed on him which
was not consented to by appellant was sufficient to commence
the running of the statute.

Appellant's affidavit submitted

with his brief is not sufficient to counteract the reality that
appellant did in fact know more than two years prior to his
filing his Notice of Claim against respondents that
unauthorized surgery had been performed on him and that the
discomfort and complications he was feeling were a result of
that unauthorized surgery.

Appellant has submitted no evidence

to indicate that his testimony at the time of the deposition
was inaccurate or that he misunderstood the substance of those
questions.

Without such evidence, the Court can only conclude

that appellant's deposition testimony taken under oath was a
clear and truthful rendition of the facts as the appellant
understood them.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT THE PERMANENT NATURE OF HIS
INJURIES WERE CONCEALED BY RESPONDENTS IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY APPELLANT'S DEPOSITION OR THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
Appellant has alleged that the health care providers
in this case fraudulently concealed their alleged negligent
-9-

actions.

The Utah legislature has codified the law concerning

fraudulent concealment in medical malpractice cases. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1)(b) reads as follows:
In an action where it is alleged that a
patient has been prevented from discovering
this conduct on the part of the health care
provider because that health care provider
has affirmatively acted to fraudulently
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim
shall be barred unless commenced within one
year after the appellant or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered, the
fraudulent concealment, whichever occurs
first.
(Emphasis added.)
A claim for medical malpractice which has been
fraudulently concealed by a health care provider must be
brought within one year after the patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the
fraudulent concealment, whichever occurs first.

In accordance

with appellant's own testimony, appellant was aware of the
unauthorized surgery performed on him and the unexpected
adverse symptoms he was suffering as a result of that surgery
on or before September of 1982. Therefore, from September of
1982, appellant cannot realistically allege that his treating
physicians were continuing to fraudulently conceal the cause of
his adverse condition.

Appellant had knowledge that surgery he

had not authorized was the cause of his unexpected suffering
and this knowledge would give a man of reasonable diligence,
albeit only a high school graduate, notice of misconduct on the
part of his health care providers sufficient to commence the
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running of this one-year statute of limitations for fraudulent
concealment as described above.
In light of the above-described one-year statute of
limitations and the previously discussed two-year statute of
limitations, appellant's Notice of Claim filed in November of
1982, over three years after discovering the unauthorized
surgery and its accompanying symptoms, is clearly barred by any
statute of limitations that could be applied in this case.
POINT III
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS SET FORTH IN THE UTAH
HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT HAS BEEN DECLARED
CONSTITUTIONAL BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.
Appellant's Brief goes through an extensive argument
alleging that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act violates
the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United
States.

Not only is this claim by appellants barred because it

was not argued previously in the hearing on respondents' Motion
for Summary Judgment (Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., Inc.,
692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984)), but also Utah case law clearly
supports the constitutionality of the statutes of limitations
in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.

In Allen v.

Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981),
the Utah Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such a
statute of limitations and specifically stated that "the
limitations statute is not constitutionally defective as a
'special law.'"
law in Utah.

Id. at 32. The Allen case is still good

Therefore, appellant's claim that the statute of
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limitations applied in this case is unconstitutional has no
merit under applicable Utah law.

POINT IV
THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-14-1(1)(b) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3).
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-4(1)(b) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) are
conflicting.

While both statutes have differing limitations

for bringing an action based on fraud, the language of the two
statutes are not inconsistent.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2)

states in part as follows:
The provisions of this section shall apply
to all persons, regardless of minority or
other legal disability under Section
78-12-36 or any other provision of the
law.
(Emphasis added.)

This portion of the statute clearly

indicates that the legislature intended for every provision of
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 to apply in medical malpractice
cases despite the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-26(3).
Appellants contend that a 1979 amendment to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) added the language "notwithstanding the
provisions of § 78-12-26" and thus created an ambiguity in the
law.

A thorough perusal of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2)

reveals no mention of the language "notwithstanding the
provisions of § 78-12-26."

In any event, the legislature has

not been inconsistent in its enactment of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act and Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 specifically
-12-

states that the provisions in that section are to apply despite
the presence of "any other provision of the law."

POINT V
APPELLANT'S APPEAL TO THE SYMPATHY OF THE COURT IS
UNSUPPORTED BY THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE
UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT.
The Utah legislature has numerous public policy
considerations to make when enacting a special statute of
limitations as in this case. Appellant's attempt in his brief
to appeal to the sympathy of the Court by contrasting the
apparent financial disparity between the appellant and
respondents is only valid to the extent such sympathy
agreements are in harmony with the applicable Utah statutory
and case law concerning this issue. Appellant can cite no Utah
statute or Utah case supporting his position.

In fact, the

Utah legislature specifically outlined the purpose of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1953
as amended) by stating in pertinent part as follows:
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of
the legislature to provide a reasonable
time in which actions may be commenced
against health care providers while
limiting that time to a specific period for
which professional liability insurance
premiums can be reasonably and accurately
calculated and to provide other procedural
charges to expedite early evaluation and
settlement of claims.
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CONCLUSION
Even viewing the record below in the light most
favorable to the appellant, this Court should conclude that the
trial court properly applied Utah's two-year medical
malpractice statute of limitations to appellant's claims.
Based on appellant's own testimony in his deposition, the court
determined that reasonable minds could not disagree that
appellant knew of his alleged injury more than two years prior
to filing his claims against respondents.

The trial court

correctly ruled that under the reasonableness test outlined in
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953 as amended), appellant had not
met either the one-year or two-year statute of limitations as
it pertains to his cause of action against respondents.

No

Utah case law exists which is contrary to the above-referenced
statute and no case law exists which would declare this statute
unconstitutional.

Also, appellant's appeal to the Court for

sympathy by comparing the various parties' financial strength
has no support in the statutory or case law of Utah.

Such

considerations were taken in account when the legislature
passed this special statute of limitations.
Therefore, appellant's arguments all fail in this
case and respondents respectfully urged this court to rule that
the District Court acted properly in granting Summary Judgment
in favor of respondents.
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